From an information theoretic perspective, whether it is a demon creating my subjective experience (or my own self as the naive solipsists love to ballber about) OR it is a real objective universe of physical reality, the Kolmogorov complexity of that perceived universe is the same.
Hence it doesn't matter how experience is being generated - ultimately it seems to have some structure and is not completely arbitrary - and therefore that K complexity has an upper bound.
To conclude - the demon if any is just part of how physics manifests - it may be real matter and energy bringing me experience, or this demon thing injecting it. Really doesnt matter.
A purely syntactic, structuralist perspective would suggest exactly this conclusion, whether it's drawn from algorithmic complexity or some other measure of 'form.' If adopted, it poses a 'hard problem' which is: why is there anything real at all in a world of form, just as consciousness theorists ask 'why is there any consciousness at all' in a world of matter. Of course in both cases, it's possible to deny the hard problem, i.e., to say there's nothing else but form or nothing else but matter and the respective hard problem is a non-problem.
From an information theoretic perspective, whether it is a demon creating my subjective experience (or my own self as the naive solipsists love to ballber about) OR it is a real objective universe of physical reality, the Kolmogorov complexity of that perceived universe is the same.
Hence it doesn't matter how experience is being generated - ultimately it seems to have some structure and is not completely arbitrary - and therefore that K complexity has an upper bound.
To conclude - the demon if any is just part of how physics manifests - it may be real matter and energy bringing me experience, or this demon thing injecting it. Really doesnt matter.
A purely syntactic, structuralist perspective would suggest exactly this conclusion, whether it's drawn from algorithmic complexity or some other measure of 'form.' If adopted, it poses a 'hard problem' which is: why is there anything real at all in a world of form, just as consciousness theorists ask 'why is there any consciousness at all' in a world of matter. Of course in both cases, it's possible to deny the hard problem, i.e., to say there's nothing else but form or nothing else but matter and the respective hard problem is a non-problem.